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NATURAL SELECTION IN SOCIOLOGY¹

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The keystone of the Darwinian arch is still rejected by the ancient builders, to whom it is an unreality. The metaphysicians contend that the principle of natural selection is "not an idea," and, as the world is to them a system of ideas, they feel the alleged process to be alien and unrelated to the rest of their thought. Hence, having failed to grasp its significance, they have made no use of the conception; and they work out their solutions of sociological problems with this supreme factor omitted; thus leaving, not only Hamlet, but the ghost, or the determining agent, out of the play. Even a Simmel exhausts the "sociology of secrecy and secret societies" without ever perceiving the operation of this grand agency. Obediently following Spencer, whom he never names, he brings into line, one after another, the characteristic Spencerian concepts of differentiation and integration, individuation and environment, without which his metaphysical sociology would not exist; but the demiurge, whose sportive Puck and dainty Ariel these are, has escaped his purview. The metaphysician in society has not yet advanced from nature to grace.

If natural selection is no idea, then is the Deity no idea; substance, the absolute, the world-generating ego, the unconditioned, and all the brood of ultimates that are lineally descended from the conception of a Deity are "no ideas." For natural selection is no invention of Darwin. It came to him, not he to it. It was an inheritance, not an acquisition, still less, a creation. It is more the final outcome of a long cosmic process, of which

¹ The present article is a continuation of a series contributed to *Knowledge* during the last few years. The first, on "The Origin of Sociological Species," appeared in October, 1902; two, on "Cross-Fertilisation in Sociology," in February and April, 1903; four, on "The Struggle for Existence in Sociology," in June, August, November, and December, 1903; and one, on "Variability in Sociology," in September, 1904.

the ghost of the savage chief was the first term. Let us see how the master describes his vision of the universe as governed by this agency, and how the background of his thought constantly betrays its origin.

Darwin's view of natural selection is so beautifully consistent from first to last that it could never have been gathered from a host of conflicting facts, but must have sprung from the depths of his consciousness, not from its surface. He is so destitute of poetical imagination that his wings fail to lift him, and his expression is everywhere inadequate to his thought. All the more, it is sincere, as the diction of few writers is. Very gradually did the new concept disclose to him its real nature. Both French and English critics made merry over the anthropomorphism of *The Origin of Species*. Natural selection there figures as a transcendent Power that is ever on the watch for the appearance of variations throughout the world, scrutinizes them narrowly, rejects this and accepts that, masses and perpetuates them, and thus constructs a new organ or builds up a new species. It evidently bears an uncommonly close resemblance to Providence, which science was believed to have shunted, and even to that Special Providence which, Carlyle tells us, all logic is against, though all sentiment is for it. The idea is, in fact, the legacy bequeathed to the naturalist by his dying religion. John Sterling told Caroline Fox that he had learned to clothe the abstractions of German metaphysics with flesh and blood, earnestly to believe in them, and confidently to reason from them. That was exactly what Darwin did with his potent new entity. For five and twenty years he lived with it and brooded over it. He made a reality, an idol, a god of it. Perhaps in no other way could he have realized its efficacy or applied it with such success to resolve problems hitherto insoluble. In no other way, at all events, can others grasp it in its length and breadth, its living and breathing substance. No one in our time would seem to have dealt such rude blows to the old theism as Darwin has dealt. He has fashioned a Supreme Power whose chief agent is the genius of destruction; whose scene of operations is a battlefield; to which love and hatred, virtue and vice, intelligence and trickery,

loyalty and dissimulation, are equally acceptable instruments; which revels in contradictions and contents itself with imperfections; which is as capricious as a child and blunders as recklessly. Small resemblance here, it might be thought, to the transcendent watchmaker of Paley, the stern Jehovah of Calvinism, or the benevolent Deity of modern humanitarianism. The antagonism and the iconoclasm are almost wholly illusory. Hardly an attribute that Darwin ascribes to natural selection but may be paralleled by attributes that worshipers of all faiths have ascribed to their divinities. It could not be otherwise, the laws of thought remaining constant. As the abstractions of the metaphysician are the shadows of dead gods, the generalizations of the savant are the survivals of extinct anthropomorphisms. New natural selection is but old creation writ larger and somewhat differently conceived. Thus Darwinism is but Calvinism otherwise stated and applied to natural history. There would have been no Darwin had there been no Calvin. But there would be a new Calvin now that there has been a Darwin. We may read human life and history afresh in the light of the new revelation. We may restate the old laws and find them radically unchanged.

In exploring history we seem to walk on shifting sands. Contradictions start up on all sides. Races, peoples, dynasties, sociological species of every description, are alternately aided and injured, preserved and destroyed by identical agencies. A similar relationship may be a help or a hindrance. A son may buttress his father's throne, like the Black Prince, or may take up the responsibilities of government from his father's sinking hands, like George the Fourth, or the recently crowned King of Sweden; or he may be actively or secretly hostile, like that same George and other princes of Wales, Louis the Eleventh, and Frederick the Great; or, again, it may be necessary in the interests of the state that an heir-apparent should be put to death, like Crispus, Carlos, and Alexis. The marital bond is still more potent for good or evil. The wife of a ruler may be the means of introducing a new religion, like queens of old France, mediaeval Russia, and modern Prussia; or she may use her influence to keep religion

reactionary, like a late empress of the French, and education obscurantist, like her immediate predecessor. The wife of a general may aid him to save an empire, as Serena aided Stilicho, while the wife of a ruler, like the same Eugénie, may inflame the spirit that provoked a ruinous war. The fraternal relation has likewise its uses and its dangers. The Turk can "bear no brother near the throne," while, in a more advanced state of society, the king of Siam distributes his brothers as deputies throughout the kingdom. The earliest law of marriage, endogamy, is apt to be injurious, as to the Braganzas, if allowed to survive its utility, or as may be seen in any fishing or mining village; while the exogamy that supersedes it sometimes gains support or additional territory, but oftener brings endless wars in its train. The same quality is advantageous or disadvantageous at different times. Mildness of character was injurious to Marcus Antoninus, ruinous to Louis the Meek, and fatal to the emperor Tacitus; it added to the popularity of Louis XII. His repute for sanctity clothed Louis IX with authority, but impaired the power of Edward the Confessor; while devilishness did not thwart the plans of Louis XI. Unchastity destroyed more than one Roman emperor, a king of Norway, and queens of Scotland and Spain; it did not injure Henry VIII or Napoleon I, but it threatened the throne of Napoleon III; it was fatal to Gambetta, Boulanger, and Parnell, but was not detrimental to recent English statesmen whose position was more secure. Avarice may be beneficial, as in the case of Louis XII, Elizabeth, and several Prussian sovereigns; but it is oftener injurious, and a retrenching colonial ministry has accomplished its painful but necessary task by the sacrifice of its popularity; while another colonial ministry secures a prolonged lease of office in Victoria, by the policy that proved fatal in New Zealand. Mere self-sacrifice may be publicly fruitful or unfruitful according to circumstances. A New Zealand premier who sacrificed his life to his mission of introducing state socialism into his colony may bequeath to his successors an unprecedented term of office and power; while another, who also sacrifices his life, but in the cause of honest government, may die unavailingly and in despair, alike for himself and his colony.

The banner of reform may float over victory or over defeat; a reforming policy that may be safe in a father, as in Septimius Severus, is unsafe in a son, as in Caracalla. Wealth is often indispensable, and it aided the establishment of the Medicean dynasty, which assured the independence of Florence; but the wealth of Florence led to the loss of its liberty. To succeed, an artist must have some kind of superiority; but Paul Baudry's superiority was injurious to him; and, in general, it is not the most brilliant men, but the safest, who are appointed to posts of honor and emolument in every country. So is it with peoples: "the hapless gift of beauty" may be fatal, as it was to "the Niobe of nations," and as eloquence and imagination have been to Ireland. The intellectual superiority of Constantinople over Rome did not aid it in its struggle for the papacy; but the considerable part that the Italian princes played in the Renaissance was serviceable to them. Venice was long unsympathetic to the Renaissance, and it flourished; Florence was its chief seat, and it gained enormously by its pre-eminence. Opposite qualities may be alike disastrous. Courage is sometimes fatal, as in Alexander Severus, and may lead to the fall of a dynasty; while cowardice may no less extinguish, as in Heliogabalus. Humanity may be fatal, and so has often been cruelty. Novelty, or variability, is the driving-wheel of the cosmos, and they win who exhibit it; but variation in excess, or prematurely, disappears or is disastrous; while peoples, like the Arabs, have survived for a thousand years in an unchanging environment, because they refused to vary. Conservatism, or heredity, is the sheet anchor of society, and those peoples, like England and Russia, most successfully weathered the storms of the French revolutionary wars which had most internal stability; but stagnation was fatal to Austria in 1848 and 1866, as it had been to Prussia in 1806. Defects may prove useful: the papacy was aided by Gregory the Great's simplicity and the French monarchy by Louis the Twelfth's good-nature. Everything has its time and place. The same quality is not the same in two different countries or at two different periods. Fitness to the environment brands two apparent identities as, for the occasion, unlike. Courage is not courage

when prudence is wanted. Private indulgence may be, as in Marcus Antoninus, Severus, and Carus it was, a public wrong. Even where the crimes of a ruler, as Henry VIII or Napoleon, are demonstrably such, if they do not touch the essence of his character or affect the value of his work, he is allowed to commit them, and he is not too severely punished. When the individual is punished, like Louis XI and Napoleon, his work may remain.

What, then, are the real features and inner characters of that Proteus which presents such a changing mask? What are the laws of that selection by nature, of that fitness which survives, of that adaptation to the environment which evolves new species? They are manifestly numerous, often complex, variable, and hard to seize.

The history of brute strength in the animal kingdoms rehearses the part that the most visibly imposing of the elements is to play on the theater of human history. In the first geological epoch animals were still small, feeble, and (so to speak) unfinished. In the secondary epoch the mammoth dinosaurian reptiles reveal brute force at its apogee, but still with little sensibility or intelligence. "The angel shows itself rarely and with difficulty through the highly organized brute," says Amiel in one of his felicitous moments. In the tertiary epoch the size of animals was lessened: the largest animals—the elephant, the mastodon, the dinotherium—did not equal the dinosaurs. On the other hand, there was a continuous progress in sensibility and intelligence. The quaternary epoch witnessed a continuous decline in the size of the terrestrial mammals. Not at first, then, but secondarily, the supreme power incarnates itself in physical force, riots there for a while, then flees to embody itself in quite other qualities and attributes.

Sociological species of all kinds are likewise small and feeble at the outset. Their slowly gathering strength masses itself in races, peoples, individuals of huge proportions, and their second stage is perhaps that of their greatest visible force. They slowly decline in manifest bulk, and their epoch of greatest power is that when their forms are grown moderate and well proportioned.

The path of conquest is the path of the Titans. They peopled

the center and north of Europe and determined the type that should rule the world for ages to come. The primitive so-called Aryans are described as a tall, vigorous, and athletic race. The Gauls were of great stature and large-limbed. The Germans were still taller and more savage. The Celts were tall, powerful, and muscular. That the Ligurians and the Iberians, who were "short, with slender bones, and feeble muscular attachments," gave way before the Gauls, and the Gauls before the Germans, seems to witness to the victory of physical force. And it cannot be denied that the British have conquered the French—have driven them from the East Indies and the West Indies, from Canada and North America, from the Mediterranean and Egypt, and are displacing their commerce and language all over the globe—in virtue largely of their superior bodily strength. They ride, boat, row, swim, and are famous for their physical carnivals and international sports. It seems to have been the hardy and handy, the sporting and out-of-doors living colonials who contributed most to defeat the Boers in the later stages of the South African war.

In these and all such cases the possession of bodily strength or aptitude was an obvious advantage. The weapons of the Gauls who took Rome were inferior to those of the Romans; their numbers were less and their discipline no greater; but the effeminacy of the Romans was easily overcome by the bodily force of the Gauls. In other cases the physical superiority may have been allied to other superiorities. The Celts who drove the Ligurians and the Iberians before them had better weapons; the English who drove the French from Canada and elsewhere were better supported by their government or by the colonial governments; and the French who fail as colonists are more disabled by unsatisfied domestic affections than the English; and so on. But physical force will often, at least, be found to be a, where it is not the, determining element. In Darwinian language, the giant, robust, and conquering species are probably the result of variations in the direction of greater size and strength being seized on by natural selection, accumulated, and distributed.

Political institutions have owed their origin to such a varia-

tion, thus selected. "I believe in violence," said the late Dr. Parker, the preacher of a religion of love, whose Founder told that the kingdom of heaven—namely, absolute truth, right living, true blessedness—is not taken by violence. And Bodin believed that societies had their beginning "in very force and violence." Both have undoubtedly their place. When the young prairie stallion, bull, or ape, which has previously fought with and, by superior strength, defeated a rival, breaks away from the troop, with his cortège of females and young, and forms a new society, he uses force, even (as often happens) to the killing of deserters; but his harem follows him also willingly from the instinct of hero-worship that is innate in animals. And the two unequally yoked factors of the common life lead it from first to last.

A variation of physical force sometimes gives rise to chieftainship. Some Indian hill-tribes have never known inequality. Among the Fuegians, though they have powerful and resolute men among them, there seems to be perfect equality. Among the Australians, who are slightly more advanced, we may observe the beginnings of chiefship, and it is apparently founded on physical superiority. In old Victoria a wild white man, of colossal proportions, was believed to be a dead chief resuscitated. Almost always, in early communities, the possession of it is an advantage. Where it is lacking, there must be exceptional qualities of mind or character to supply the want of it.

It remains an attribute of priceless value where early social states survive. Charles Martel and Pepin the Short had the strength of an ox. Charlemagne was of gigantic stature and strength. Caesar Borgia was the finest man of his time, with the strength of an athlete, and he owed his ascendancy to the fact. We may add that he is held to have founded the temporal power of the papacy. King Ferdinand of Spain and Duke Alfonso of Bisceglia were two of the finest princes of their time. When an empire sinks into barbarism, the character of its rulers will reflect the prevailing temper. In such ages it is an advantage, when it is not a necessity, that the ruler, who is usually at the same time the military chief, should possess bodily strength. Men of feeble make, like the emperors Tacitus and Alexander Severus, are de-

feated almost in advance. Yet in only a few instances is the possession of corporeal strength the decisive attribute. Maximin was promoted from the ranks by an emperor because of his physical force, and he rose to be emperor through strength alone; but he soon perished, with his family, from the disgust and hatred he excited. Another athlete, Basil the Macedonian, on the other hand, founded a notable dynasty that lasted for nearly two hundred years and still lives in the Bourbons. The one was a brutal savage, while the other was an enlightened ruler. Not physical strength, but intellectual superiority, thus modified the Eastern Empire.

When a revolution has to be accomplished—when a social structure many centuries old, and buttressed by all the props of tradition, has to be overthrown, it may be necessary for its success that the revolutionary movement should be incarnated in a Titan. Perhaps the “divine brutality” of the miner’s son could alone have carried the German Reformation to a successful issue. At the Diet of Worms substitute the yielding nature of the diminutive Melanchthon for the brawny figure of Luther, and what would have been the result? It matters little whether the battle is moral or physical. Mirabeau had a robust constitution (he was born, like Louis Quatorze, with two teeth already cut) and the body of an athlete. Could a less Herculean personality have converted a simmering mass of discontent into a destructive torrent? Had the prim and slender Robespierre figured at the beginning of the convention instead of at its end, and had the elemental Danton changed places with him, would there have been the Reign of Terror?

When a dying race, like the Merwings, has become impotent, the stalwart leaders of a fresh stock, like Charles Martel and Pepin the Short, may owe their ascendancy in part to their physical prowess.

Numbers, the secondary form of force, come into play in the second stage, and they may be considered a consequence of the ascendancy of a physically powerful individual or clan, combined with favoring circumstances. We conceive the legendary invasions of early Europe as triumphs of physical force and as having

been effected by huge masses. In most instances it is by an error of historical perspective. Almost every invasion has been begun by single individuals—travelers and explorers, missionaries and merchants. The armies that follow them are often small. The Macedonian conqueror subdued Asia with 35,000 men. The Romans conquered Gaul with less than 30,000. The numbers assigned to the invading Franks in the fifth century are only 12,000. The British have conquered India with a handful of English troops, aided by Indian auxiliaries. Fustel de Coulanges doubted if mere force was capable of creating or sustaining any government whatever. In fact, conquerors have often been welcomed. Many European peoples joyfully received Julius Caesar. Caesar Borgia was loved by the populace, and his resurrection expected.

Other qualities come in aid of force, even when it is greatest. It was not physical strength that conquered Europe for Napoleon. The French soldiers at Jena, said a German, were small men, but they fought like devils. Walter Scott saw in the hospital at Brussels the French who had been wounded at Waterloo. He was struck with the suppressed fury of their looks. The fiery horsemen in Detaille's picture of the battle of Friedland will evidently prove formidable combatants.

Force, even in its grossest form, may at length be half redeemed by being shot through with high spiritual qualities. In an eloquent passage the historian of "the liberal empire" has well shown that a victory in the field is due, not more to the military forces employed, than to the savant who has perfected their arms, the poet who has exalted the imaginations, the historian who has recited the national glories, the artist who has delineated them, the philosopher who has taught contempt of death, the orator who has celebrated patriotism, and the statesman who has negotiated alliances and fashioned public opinion. *Pace* M. Ollivier, it may even enlist the power of conscience on its side, and a people may intervene (as in Italy and Cuba) in the interests of rectitude.

So far from mere size and strength being necessarily advantageous and thus leading to victory in the struggle for existence, they are often disadvantages, and smallness is not seldom a gain.

How many species are there that have survived in consequence of their diminutive proportions! In the sphere of sociology, most of the great empires, from the Assyrian to the Napoleonic, have had a brief duration. Small communities, on the other hand, live on in virtue of their smallness. The republics of San Marino and Andorra and the principality of Montenegro have been aided by nature to survive. Monaco and Württemberg, even Belgium and Switzerland, appeal to the chivalry of mankind, which would resent their absorption by a powerful neighbor. Smallness is especially favorable in guerilla warfare. The Aragonese nobles were able to resist their sovereign, Ferdinand, because they could maneuver small bands in the mountains. Smallness was the strength of the Boers in the South African war.

Nevertheless, other things being equal, mass must in the long run be decisive in sociology, as in every physical province. The innumerable Japs may beat the more numerous Russians a second time, perhaps, but at length, unless the Japanese succeed in infusing their own living spirit into the dead or sleeping masses of China, the Russian excess of numbers will tell. France, reduced from forty millions to thirty-eight and remaining stationary, stands already defeated before the German sixty millions, which still increase. The massing of peoples generally, through the disappearance of racial or historic distinctions, will give an irresistible advantage to numbers. The most multitudinous peoples—the North Americans and the Russians—will dominate the future, if only because they will furnish scope for the emergence of varieties. The winning form of government or code of laws, the all-conquering religion, has the best chance of springing up in a widespread and populous state.

The conflict between classes in a society is a continuation of the struggle between peoples. The kingly races and the nobles in many countries were formed by or consisted of the invading races. Abundant evidence shows that, amid a dark population, they long had the light hair and fair complexion of the conquering Aryans. In some countries, as in Pelasgic Greece, the physical superiority may have been accentuated by intellectual or other superiority. That it was not so in Italy, Spain, or Gaul seems to

be proved by the adoption of the language of the conquered. For thirteen hundred years in western Europe the classes thus held the masses in subjection. This superiority in part disappeared with the introduction of gunpowder. English serfage declined with the victories of the cross-bowmen on the fields of Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. The successive advances of the Third Estate and the modifications of all political species—legislative, administrative, judicial—are due in part to the same decline of physical force.

Long after physical force has ceased to be used or displayed, it remains in the background as a means of coercion. The uprisings of the masses are often suppressed by the menace to employ it. In 1848, when the Chartists threatened London, the Duke of Wellington told Bunsen that he would answer for the keeping of the peace, but not a man should be called out unless there was an absolute necessity for it. In 1867 the tide had turned, and power passed to the other side. The masses then acquired the possession of force, and the classes (represented by a conservative government) did not dare to summon the military; even the threat was a *brutum fulmen*. The event symbolized a whole history. Visible physical force is the outward symbol of the intellectual and moral power of the community, concentrated in a military aristocracy. As it spreads, it becomes less obtrusively military, and ultimately it becomes almost coextensive with the population.

The battle is henceforth transferred from the field to the senate. Physical force is now refined, but it is still visibly there. In old countries like England, the conservative benches of the House of Commons are (or used to be) filled by men of no small physical bulk, stolid and impassive; while the liberals and the radicals (with notable exceptions, such as Sir W. Harcourt) are often light-weights. It has been observed that the labor leaders of recent years are commonly men of slight physique and feeble make. The rocklike conservatives are thus able to make a massive resistance to the attacks of the liberals, while the liberals are the billows that dash against the rocks, and the radicals resemble the spray that arises from the shock. On all such variations of physical force from age to age natural selection

lays hold, giving it, as it emerges, the signs and seals of power and authority, but only because such physical manifestations are the effluence of a moral or intellectual force which thus vindicates its right to rule.

The part of physical force in the administration will vary with the character of the policy adopted. A pacific policy will make room for classes and individuals in whom physical force has not a large hereditary development. The forty years' peace in Europe witnessed statesmen with puny frames, such as Thiers, Guizot, and Russell, and a woman as the chief sovereign in western Europe. With the revival of the war spirit and the coming to the front of a military race, statesmen of a different stamp were wanted. Hence the twenty-five years' reign of Bismarck. The great chancellor was a colossus; his whole form and every feature bore the imprint of power. When he fell, he was succeeded by a milder man of the same physical stamp, who was (for the time) the last of the race. The gain of brute force, to Prussia, first, and then to all Germany, was enormous; it fashioned the supremacy of Prussia and procured the victory of Germany. With the gaining of these ends its uses ceased. A chancellor of the type of Bismarck would now be injurious. Hence Germany has had a Hohenlohe and then a Bülow—statesmen of the conventional type.

The history of marital relations exhibits a similar evolution. The example of the animals shows that pairing cannot have been at the outset wholly the work of force. But force soon entered. Exogamy is the second stage of savage marriage, and in its earliest form exogamy means violence. It is not at first easy to perceive what a tribe had to gain by rapes that often involved it in war. If legend may be accepted as containing a grain of history, a whole people may have owed its subjugation to the practice. On the other hand, alliances that arose out of such marriages (like that between the tribe of Pocahontas and the Virginians) would neutralize the wars. Darwin and Weismann come to the rescue. If cross-fertilization is the cause of all or even only of favorable variations, tribes or peoples may have owed to such unions the birth of men who advanced it in new

ways. The captured females, at all events, introduced new blood which must have communicated fresh vigor to the tribe. In just this way have been bred the conquering races. The invading peoples of the fifth century, carrying few women with them and intermarrying with the indigenes, have developed the most robust of European peoples. The toughest and most enterprising of all are the most exogamous—the North Americans.

In the relations between husband and wife and between parents and children the element of force long plays its part. Abductions are not uncommon: the foundation and settlement of New Zealand arose out of the consequences of a romantic abduction. It was a surprise to many worthy people when a lord chancellor laid it down a few years ago that a man could not legally use force to recover his wife. After force has deserted the formation of the relationship, it remains to aid in its maintenance or insure its dissolution. How considerable a part it may play we perceive in the old Roman freedom of divorce, which affected party struggles in the declining republic.

The utility of sternness in the rearing of children is found by Hallam in the firmness of character thus given to them. Obviously, families so reared would gain in strength for the battle of life. The Greys and Burleighs of the sixteenth century, the stern Huguenots, and the rugged Scottish Covenanters thus acquired their grit. So did the formation of the *patria potestas* in ancient Rome give a band of cohesion to the family which long effectually resisted disintegration and infused constancy into that iron breed.

The *ultima ratio* of force plays a large part in the religious struggle, and there is hardly any material form of the conflict which its history does not exhibit. In the most sacred arena of the human spirit brute force runs riot. A complete enumeration of the means used in different ages to gain the victory for one religion over another would exhaust the possibilities of human action in the physical sphere. Few religions owe to it their introduction into a country; most owe to it their establishment there. The purest religions seem to find it indispensable. A subtle kind of physical force will be found to lie at the back of the least

aggressive. The religion that develops such force from within or acquires it from without alone gains an ascendancy.

Is it possible to sum up, in a few sentences, the part that force has played, in all its forms, in establishing or suppressing religions? It is a commonplace to assert that the persecution they have undergone has strengthened them. Personal and public hostility did not quench the zeal of the fiery soul that uttered the maxim: the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church; but such men have at all times been in a minority. Public persecution cowers most communities as petty persecution cowers most individuals. The letters of Cyprian of Carthage, some documents preserved in the *Ecclesiastical History* of Eusebius, the evidence of Tertullian, and the whole history of the church show that the *lapsi* were numerous, and their numbers grew as the wealth of the Christians increased. Persecution crushed Paganism and checked the advance of Christianity; it suppressed, if it never quite extinguished, Arianism, Nestorianism, and fifty other heresies; it stamped out Islam and Judaism in Spain; it rooted up nascent Protestantism in Spain, Italy, and (as has lately been discovered²) on the banks of the Durance so early as 1530; it blighted adolescent Protestantism in Belgium, Bohemia, and throughout France. It failed to destroy Presbyterianism in Scotland, but a political accident brought its short career there to an untimely end. Persecution extinguished the pre-Moslem religion in Arabia, and it reduced the Nestorian Christians of Persia from 5,000 or 6,000 families to 800, 500, or 300.

There is, then, an unmistakable sanction for force in the history of religions. Probably all the greater religions and many of their sects have in turn appealed to it and been consolidated by it. Brahminism and Buddhism, Christianity, Catholicism and Protestantism, Anglicanism and Presbyterianism, have been established by it and the rival religions or sects disadvantaged or crushed. Not only is force not alien to religion, but there seems to be a close affinity between it and the religious or at least the ecclesiastical temper. More than any other of the

² Gaston Boissier, *Fin du paganisme*, I, 384.

spiritual powers, religion naturally clothes itself with authority. The sight of a rival religion almost maddens the adherents of others. A dying religion that refuses to die requires to be put to death. It was the pressure of the bishops that made the Roman emperors resort to violence. Even the great Augustine, not for the first time obeying his passions, advocated its use in a letter that served as the Magna Charta of persecution all through the Middle Ages. Gregory the Great urged rulers to bring back heretics by force. Boniface appealed for military aid to these same rulers because he could not extinguish heathenism without it. Instructed and evidently unbiased contemporary scholars, like M. Lavissee, hold that the new religion could have been saved only by authority. A firm and precise discipline, he maintains, was needed to rescue those barbarous tribes from the powerful and seducing dominion of the old cults. So impartial a judge as Victor Duruy doubts whether the civil wars of France in the sixteenth century could have been avoided. They and the massacres that accompanied them destroyed 800,000 lives, and among these were some of the sagest heads and strongest natures in the kingdom. Men of an antique grandeur of character, like L'Hôpital and Agrippa d'Aubigné; men and women who were invincible in adversity, like Coligny, Henry of Navarre, and Jeanne d'Albret, disappeared from France once for all, and it is but at rare intervals that *revenants* like Guizot reveal the character of an extinct race.

None the less, there are evident limits to the efficacy of force. It must move in the same direction as public opinion. A succession of decrees and edicts issued by the Senate and the emperors against the invasion of foreign cults was innocuous because it ran counter to the popular sentiment. A similar succession of Imperial edicts against Paganism from Constantine to Theodosius remained without real effect because the old religion was still too deeply rooted. It must also be in conformity with the genius of a race or people. How imperfectly the work of conversion was accomplished among the Saxons seems to be shown by the origin of the Protestant Reformation among them, their ready acceptance of it, and their propagation of it throughout Europe. They

had been Protestants all along. Less than a century after the missionary Boniface converted the Austrasian Germans by the aid of force to Roman Christianity the converted peoples had been reconverted to a freer faith than they had been taught by this man of rule and cannon, and had transformed the Roman Christ he had introduced into a German Christ. The Moslems of Andalusia and the Marranos can never have become true Christians. If Catholicism reconquered France, Austria, and South Germany, it did not conquer their intellects; scientific and philosophic France became skeptical, and Catholic Germany became the most Protestant of Catholic peoples. A line of organic cleavage seems to separate the Catholic from the Protestant peoples. The longheaded, blonde races are Protestant; the dark, broadheaded races are Catholic. Force crosses such a line only in appearance. Nothing but the mixing of stocks that is rapidly taking place will make practicable the passage of a religion from one people to another.

Even the literary and aesthetic social functions may have their origin in a variation of physical force, accompanied by an intellectual or aesthetic variation. The earlier poets belonged to the military class whose deeds they sang, and the first artists were offshoots of the governing class whose portraits or achievements they delineated. Only in later ages could an English merchant tell his nephew, Pope, and Sir Godfrey Kneller that he could buy far better specimens of humanity on the coast of Africa for ten guineas. Science and philosophy sometimes gain in the field of controversy through the physical strength of their champions; Tait, Huxley, and Tyndall owed some of their fighting vigor to their athletic frames. Descartes and Vauvenargues had been soldiers, and Victor Cousin had the very temperament of a fighter; Schiller and Schelling had the aspect of military officers; and Sir William Hamilton diverted to philosophy a long inheritance of physical strength. At certain stages in its history philosophy has therefore been advantaged through its adoption as a career by men of unusual physical energy.

From another side both science and philosophy have lost through the antagonism of brute force. The speculative reason

should be free as air, yet its eagle wings have often been clipped. Philosophical sects were repeatedly suppressed in the Roman Empire. Socrates was poisoned, and his disciples were scattered. Anaxagoras and Wolf were banished. Bruno and Vanini were burned. Ramus was butchered. Campanella underwent almost lifelong imprisonment. Descartes was scared and Kant intimidated. Will it be said that these were acts of individual significance, with which sociology has no concern? Is it nothing (to take only one example) that the philosophy of Giordano Bruno was thus extinguished for three centuries, till it was revived by John Addington Symonds as a philosophic *credo* that might be held by evolutionists of a spiritual type in our own time?

The more material pursuit of science has likewise been thus arrested. Tycho Brahe was driven from Denmark. Roger Bacon and Galileo were imprisoned. Levoisier was told that "the republic had no need of chemists," and he was guillotined. A crowd destroyed Priestley's instruments. Many a wizard who has been mobbed was only a daring experimentalist, and it is impossible to reckon how many discoveries have thus been nipped in the bud. Late in their history the sciences may thrive by the aid of that same physical force, usually masked under the powers of government, but sometimes nude. The Phœnician researches of Renan were protected by the presence of a French military contingent, and the finds of the archaeologist have often been made under the aegis of a distant power.

This long roll of examples seems to prove that a variation in the direction of bodily force has often aided and sometimes given the victory to a cause; transmitted, it has consolidated and perpetuated an institution, carried it through the troubles of infancy, and then handed it over to those powers of government which are but physical force at one remove, next to the power of wealth, then finally to the powers of intellect, science, and character.

We may go still farther and affirm that every social institution which is to survive and play its part must gather to itself adequate physical force. Wholly lacking this, it must succumb; partially clothed with this, it is maimed and ineffective; fully

embodied in this it conquers and endures. We are not therefore pledged to follow Carlyle when he asserts that, right being "the eternal symbol of might," every cause thus incarnated is just; still less are we constrained to adhere to Hegel and the Germans when they affirm that those causes alone which are thus invested are just. No enthusiast and no ardent reformer will ever accept this bastard determinism. The choice of Hercules is offered to most nations as to most men. Does a people spurn a proffered boon and decline to lead the higher life opened to it by (e. g.) the Protestant reformation, as did France and Spain, Italy, Bohemia, and South Germany, or refuse to climb the steep and rugged path with Oliver Cromwell, as did Caroline England, then the truth and the right turn sadly away and depart in silence, and under their solemn fillet, with Emerson, we see the scorn; while the apostate people sinks down to a lower plane of thought and life, as all of these recusant peoples have done. Catholicism was not therefore right or Puritanism wrong.

We shall not, then, disparage physical force. It is, indeed, but the primitive manifestation of all strength. There is but one force, whether it flames from Vesuvius, or launches armed masses across territorial frontiers, or sways peoples by spoken or written word or wonder-working sound, or is the soul of great causes. How spiritual it is at bottom is seen from the fact that periods of military conquest are preceded, followed, or accompanied, as in Elizabethan England, France of the Restoration, and contemporary Germany and Japan, by periods of intellectual conquest and political ardor, scientific advance and aesthetic development. The law of the correlation and convertibility of physical forces is applicable to social forces. Artistic and speculative, social and spiritual activities are but the ideal counterpart of the energies of war and conquest. The impersonal forces, such as predestination, equality, divine right, and the like, which to the mind of a Catholic thinker like Lord Acton rule the world, need a physical base or a material embodiment, and a graduated scale might be drawn that would connect the grossest with the most ethereal of cosmic forces.